Understanding Game Theory via Wireless Power Control
I n this lecture note, we introduce the basic concepts of game theory (GT), a branch of mathematics traditionally studied and applied in the areas of economics, political science, and biology, which has emerged in the last 15 years as an effective framework for communications, networking, and signal processing (SP). The real catalyst has been all of the blooming issues related to distributed networks in which the nodes can be modeled as players in a game competing for system resources. Some relevant notions of GT are introduced by elaborating on a simple application in the context of wireless communications, notably the power control in an interference channel (IC) with two transmitters and two receivers.
RelevanCe
Recently, the mathematical tools of GT [1] have attracted a significant interest by the wireless communications and SP engineering communities [2, Part II] due to the need for designing autonomous, distributed, and flexible systems in which the available resources are allocated through low-complexity and scalable procedures. Games are appealing, owing to some characteristics that are not common in classical optimization: as an example, GT can handle interactive situations in which each player can only have a partial control over the optimization variables while using its own performance metric. It is true that commonalities can be found with other disciplines, such as multiobjective optimization [3] , convex optimization [4] , and learning theory [5] , but GT possesses many distinguishing features that make it essential for the standard current toolbox of communication as well as SP engineers.
PReReqUIsITes
The readers require basic knowledge in linear algebra, wireless communications, and signal processing theory.
WhaT Is a Game?
To take advantage of GT and its associated theoretical tools, the first step is to model the problem at hand as a game. In doing so, three ingredients must be identified:
■ players who represent the main actors in the problem, having conflicting interests and affecting the performance of everyone else in the game ■ a set of strategies available to each player that determines what each player can do ■ a utility function for each player that measures its degree of satisfaction as a function of the combination of all player's choices. This description may encompass a large number of situations: to mention a few examples, players in a game can be base stations (BSs) allocating the resources in a cellular network to increase the system throughput, or watermarking devices choosing algorithms to face potential attackers.
The objective of the modeling effort is to describe the game using its strategic-form representation: a triplet , ! only) over the optimization variables. The first property is strictly tied with multiobjective optimization [3] , although a clear difference exists in the scope of the optimization variables, as in multiobjective optimization we have full control over all variables. The second property is tightly related to the framework of distributed optimization [4] , with which it shares many intersections, although there are specific differences: one of the most important is that, while in distributed optimization the agents follow some common given rules, in GT the players act as independent decision makers.
The neaR-faR effeCT Game
To picture the meaning of the strategicform representation, let us consider an example taken from a very common wireless communications scenario: the IC, represented in Figure 1 (a), in which the two transmitters interfere with each other in the attempt to reach their own receiver. This simple scheme encompasses many scenarios: it can be used to model Digital Object Identifier 10.1109 /MSP.2015 Date of publication: 15 June 2015 ■ a multicellular system with red and blue nodes belonging to two different cells ■ a heterogeneous network, where the red and blue nodes belong to a macrocell and a small cell, respectively ■ a cognitive radio system, where the red and blue nodes are primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs), respectively ■ a device-to-device system, where the receivers are also network nodes. Using GT, we can model the problem at hand in a suitable manner and provide the theoretical tools to solve it. In this case, solving means devising the optimal transmission strategy to be selected by the two wireless terminals of Figure 1 (a). In particular, we assume that the two nodes are allowed either to transmit at a certain power level p or to stay idle. This situation can be modeled as a game, with K 2 = players and strategy sets { ,
For simplicity, we also assume that the two terminals choose their strategies simultaneously (i.e., without being informed of the other's choice) once and for all (i.e., they cannot make any changes after observing the outcome of the game)-in GT parlance, we call this a static game. Finally, since players and strategy sets are both countable, the game is termed finite.
As depicted in Figure 1 (a), player 1 (the far terminal) is located much farther away from both receivers than player 2 (the near terminal). To describe this situation in a mathematical fashion, we introduce the power gains h R jk ! + experienced by terminal k's signal when propagating to receiver .
j For simplicity, let us assume h h jk k = for ,
2 % (we will better quantify this ratio at the end of this section), thereby giving rise to the so-called near-far problem.
We now need to define a utility function, and to do so we consider that each terminal achieves a degree of satisfaction that depends both on the success of its transmission and on the energy spent to transmit at power . = Measuring ( ) s tk is more complicated, as it has to capture the interaction between the players as a function of the selected strategies s1 and .
s2 In practice, successful reception of a signal in a multiple-access scenario (such as the one considered here), be it in the time, frequency, space, or code domain, depends on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) , (1)
is the processing gain, which depends on the multiple access technology and the receiver processing. = where t is a dimensionless parameter that accounts for the throughput achieved at destination. To properly capture the cost-benefit analysis that regulates any practical wireless system, it makes sense to assume .
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A profitable way to investigate finite static games in their strategic form, such as our NFE game, is through the so-called payoff matrix [ Figure 1 h achieved by the players. Under the assumptions that / h p [6] for more details), it is easy to fill out each box of the matrix based on the hypotheses listed above.
Once the game is in its strategic form, we have to solve it, i.e., to predict its outcome. In the NFE game, we assume that both players ■ are rational ■ only control their own strategies ■ know each other's payoff. The first assumption means that each player is a utility-maximizer decision maker. The second hypothesis casts this problem as a noncooperative game in which the players compete to unilaterally maximize ( ). s uk Finally, the third hypothesis involves the concept of complete information that each player has about the game. By inspecting the payoff matrix in Figure 1 (b), it is apparent that player 2's best strategy is represented by
For this reason, the strategy s 0 2 = is said to be st r ic t ly dom in ate d by ,
6 ! This is known to player 1 as well, who rationally chooses to play . 
highlighted by the shaded box in Figure 1 (b). In GT parlance, this game has been solved by applying the iterated elimination of dominated strategies, or iterated dominance for short [1, Ch. 1].
The IC Game
Let us now slightly modify the scenario represented in Figure 1 (a). Assume, for example, that player 1 is moved closer to its receiver, such that the distance between player 1 and both receivers becomes the same as the distance between player 2 and both receivers. For simplicity, let us also suppose h h jk = for , , . j k 1 2 = By using / , h p req 2 v c C =^h following the same considerations taken for the NFE game, it is easy to obtain the payoff matrix reported in Figure 2 . As an exercise, we can verify that no strictly dominated strategies exist, and thus we cannot apply the iterated dominance procedure used to solve the NFE game.
To get out of this impasse, we introduce the concept of best response (BR) ( ), s bk k = which is mat hematic ally defined as
i.e., the best that we can get out of the game once we know the opponents' moves . s k = Since player 1 chooses rows, we can compute its BR by examining the columns that can be possibly selected by player 2. When ,
The same can be obtained for player 2, and we end up with the players' BRs, underlining the relevant payoffs in Figure 2 . We find two boxes (shaded background) containing the BRs of both players, representing two stable states, where stable here means that such states are attained by some multiple agents with conflicting interests that compete through self-optimization, and they eventually reach a point where none of them has any incentive from which to unilaterally deviate.
A point that possesses such properties is termed a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game, which is defined as a strategy profile
[ , ] s s
As an exercise, check that
[ , ]
The notion of NE encompasses many interpretations of GT (not discussed here for brevity) that interested readers can find in many textbooks (e.g., [7, Ch. 1] ). Modeling the players as self-optimizing decision makers finds a suitable application especially in the context of SP in which the devices can be programmed to do so. Since each player has only a partial control of the game, the concept of NE is tightly coupled with the application of distributed algorithms and machine-learning techniques [7, Part II] .
Due to space constraints in this lecture note, we will not discuss theorems on equilibrium existence [1, Ch. 1], which establish the existence of the NE in particular classes of games, and on equilibrium uniqueness [2, Ch. 3] . When uniqueness cannot be ensured, like in the case of the IC game, we face the problem of equilibrium selection. One solution to this issue is the concept of correlated equilibrium (CE) [1, Ch. 2], a generalization of the NE, where an arbitrator helps the players to correlate their strategies, so as to favor a decision process in the interplay, e.g., letting them adopt [ , ] . [7, Ch. 2] . In our attempt to get closer to a realistic scenario, let us also modify the utilities to better model how real data networks work in practice. A good approximation for the effective throughput in a packet-oriented transmission is ( )
ConTInUoUs PoWeRs
, whose behavior is depicted (red line, left axis) in Figure 3 . In our expression, L denotes the number of information bits per packet (here, ), L 20 = and t is the communication rate (in bits/second). To properly capture the tradeoff between obtaining a satisfactory throughput and saving transmit power-similar to what is considered for the NFE and IC games-we will adopt a "green" approach based on improving each player's energy efficiency [8] . This can be done by defining player k's utility as the ratio between throughput and power expenditure, thus accounting for the number of bits correctly delivered per joule of energy consumed:
whose normalized behavior is reported (blue line, right axis) in Figure 3 , with ( ) s k k n = defined as in (1). Using straightforward manipulation, player k's BR (2) turns out to be ( ) We display in Figure 4 the (normalized) utilities at the NE (green diamond) on the bidimensional normalized utility plane, given by all achievable utility pairs ( ), ( ) s s u u 1 2 h (shaded region), for any strategy profile s S S (the utility plan can be found via a numerical search using [9] ). Note that , s s 
Is The ne effICIenT?
A natural question that arises regards the actual efficiency, or, the performance, of the NE: Is the NE efficient? To address this question, we first need to agree upon our performance metric. In GT, a convenient way to assess how desirable a solution is involves the concept of efficiency, evaluated in terms of Pareto optimality. A profile s is Pareto-optimal (PO) if there exists no other s such that 1) ( )
In our continuous IC game, the performance achieved by the PO profile set is represented by the contour of the shaded area in Figure 4 , which is called the Pareto frontier. Clearly, if we increase ( ) s u1 (i.e., if we move rightward along ), x then ( ) s u2 decreases, and the same happens if we increase ( ) s u2
(by moving upward along ).
y Still, Pareto optimality does not qualify as our performance metric.
We have to further introduce the notion of social welfare (SW), that is often used as a convenient measure for the efficiency of a strategy vector [7, Ch. 2] . Formally, the social-optimal (SO) profile s s is the PO profile that maximizes the SW, defined as the weighted sum-utility ( ), s w u
/ allow us to account for different classes of service: as an example, unequal weights can be useful to model PUs (higher wk 's) and SUs (lower wk 's) in a cognitive network. In our two-player game, we can identify s s as the tangent point between the Pareto frontier and a line with slope / . w w (Figure 4) .
We have zoomed in on a section of Figure 4 (see inset) to show that the NE s _ is socially inefficient since its performance is distinct from (more specifically, poorer than) that achieved by . s s In general, s s cannot be achieved by distributed algorithms, rather, it is the result of a global optimization and, in our case, it turns out to be unbalanced toward player 2 (the one with better channel conditions): this is reminiscent of the waterfilling policy [4] that allocates most resources to the users who can achieve higher throughputs. More importantly, the magnification in Figure 4 shows that there are a multitude of profiles that provide utilities lying in the Pareto improvement region in which ( ) ( ) s s u u k k $ _ for all k K ! (the shaded region in the inset). Consequently, the next question is: How can we improve the efficiency of the NE? In this lecture note, we focus on three popular methods:
■ modifying the utility functions ■ letting the players interact more than once ■ letting the players cooperate.
PRICInG The sTRaTeGIes
The simplest method to improve the efficiency of the NE while maintaining the game structure is by modifying the utility function. This can be done, for instance, by introducing some form of externality. This approach is, in spirit, close to mechanism design [1, Ch. 7] . For the power control games studied so far, one might think of charging the players for the powers they consume by introducing a pricing factor a (in
. The rationale behind this approach is the following: if each transmitter is discouraged from being aggressive (due to power taxation), the multiple access interference (MAI) experienced by the other is reduced, and both SINRs at the equilibrium stay as close as possible to k c _ (provided that the AWGN power 2 v is not dominant-a condition that always holds in multiple-access systems).
To evaluate the benefits of this method, we compute the NE s _ u of the modified game using the BR approach (see [9] ). The blue cross marker in Figure 4 represents the performance (( / ) ( ), s t u As can be seen, the performance of s _ u is very close to the Pareto frontier, further favoring player 2's performance compared to the SW. We have thus improved the efficiency of the game solution while maintaining the noncooperative nature of the interplay (with all its desirable properties). The main drawback is that this improvement can only be achieved after a proper tuning of a (which highly depends on system parameters). As an exercise, one could evaluate the performance of s _ u as a function of a (see [9] ).
RePeaTInG The Game
The inefficiency of the NE is mainly due to the selfish behavior (in the sense of self-optimization) of the players. An effective method to induce cooperation-while maintaining the noncooperative nature of the interaction -is forcing the players to interact more than once. A typical example of this approach is a repeated game, in which a static game is repeated N times. For instance, assume that the two transmitters of Figure 1 (a) interact a number N of times, each time selecting their optimal transmit powers ( ), s n k where n is the time index [11] . When introducing the notion of time, each strategy set Sk becomes a complete plan of actions that depends on the unfolding of the game through time.
Similarly, the utility functions must account for 1) the partial utilities ( ( )) s u n k = ( ( )) / ( ) s t n s n k k received at each stage n of the game, with ( ) s n denoting the profile selected by the players at time n, and 2) how much past utilities should be weighted (i.e., decay) compared to present utilities. A simple example is the exponential decay, where the utility at time n is weighted by the factor , / ( ( )) s n [11] . The parameter d is the socalled discount factor, and its meaning is borrowed from microeconomics: a payoff received at the present time n is larger by a factor / 1 d than the payoff of the next stage, and smaller by a factor d than that of the previous one. This means that, if players are patient (in the SP and communications context, delay tolerant), d is typically close to 1. Conversely, if players are impatient (i.e., delay sensitive), d is typically close to 0.
Extending the concept of NE to repeated games [1, Ch. 5] , we can show that the optimal strategy { ( )} s s n n 0 = s and s s and s _ being the SO and NE points, respectively, provided that $ d d (i.e., if they are delay-tolerant enough), where d is a function of the network parameters [11] . In other words, in the repeated IC game, cooperation is enforced by letting the players interact an indefinite number of times: this is successful due to threatening future punishments for the player(s) who defect.
The effectiveness of this approach is apparent in Figure 4 , where the performance of , s d represented by the black asterisk, coincides with the SW, under the assumption . which might not be viable for all scenarios (e.g., in a cognitive network). Repeated games are a subclass of dynamic games, which are often used in SP problems to account for time evolution (see [7, Ch. 3] for more details).
InTRodUCInG CooPeRaTIon amonG The PlayeRs
In the techniques considered so far, we have focused on improving the efficiency of the solution without considering any issues of fairness. In the aforementioned example, the SW is obtained by favoring player 2 to the detriment of player 1's performance, as is apparent in the inset of Figure 4 , where the SW is far away from the projection of the NE over the Pareto frontier-obtained by intersecting it with the "fair" line with slope 1 and passing through ( ( ), ( )). s s u u
We can balance efficiency and fairness by explicitly introducing cooperation among the players, assuming some explicit exchange of information. The fundamental difference of a cooperative approach is that, while in the games assumed so far, cooperation can only be induced as the result of matching it with self-optimization (i.e., unilateral deviations are not beneficial anyway), now that the players are willing to cooperate, as they know that they can mutually benefit from reaching an agreement. In GT parlance, this is called a bargaining problem [2, Ch. 7], whose analytical tools are tightly related to SP techniques, such as consensus algorithms [12] .
Consider again the continuous IC game and assume that the players can collaborate to select a satisfactory profile .
In case they fail to reach an agreement, each player k gets ( ), s uk _ where s _ is the NE of the noncooperative game studied before. On the contrary, the players now strive to attain the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), i.e., the (unique) PO profile that satisfies
Interestingly, the NBS has close analogies with proportional fair allocation mechanisms, as discussed in [2, Ch. 7] . As is apparent, the NBS tries to increase as much as possible the utilities of the players with respect to the NE in a fair manner.
The graphical interpretation of the NBS is shown in Figure 4 
The performance of so lies in between the SW and the maximumfairness projection of the NE performance, thus trading off efficiency and fairness. The reason why the NBS is unbalanced toward player 2 lies again in its better channel condition, which makes it stronger in negotiation [2, Ch. 7] .
For more than two players, we can also consider a more general cooperative framework, the coalitional GT [13] , which provides the theoretical tools to investigate situations in which subsets of players can bind agreements to work together, aiming at improving their joint utility. This approach is particularly useful in many areas of SP, such as spectrum sensing for cognitive systems (see [2, Ch. 13] for further details).
ConClUdInG RemaRks
In this lecture note, we introduced the very basic notions of GT by using a power control problem for a wireless interference channel as the leitmotiv: by further detailing and adding features to this "toy example," we presented the concepts of players, strategies, utilities, NE, and Pareto and social optimality, among others. Interested readers who want to deepen their knowledge of GT are encouraged to review specific textbooks, such as general ones (e.g., [1] ), and those specifically tailored to an SP audience (e.g., [2] and [7] ).
RePRodUCIble ReseaRCh
We have provided supplementary material in [9] that is available for download. The material includes MATLAB code that can reproduce all the simulation results. 
